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ASSISTANCE IN ADDITION TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS: THE NEED FOR; THE LACK OF;
THE RIGHT TO
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]o a serious extent, the scales of justice in this
country are weighted against the poor. Each year
thousands are confronted with obstacles to obtaining
justice because they are financially unable to obtain
adequate defense.'
The existence of a high number of these "obstacles" is attributable to
the accused's financial inability to procure those defense services without
which his attorney is unable to fashion an adequate defense. In a con-
temporary adversarial confrontation the contribution of an expert witness
or a private investigator may very well be crucial to the accused's de-
fense. Notwithstanding this fact, each year a large portion of those
brought to trial must forego such assistance because they lack the re-
sources to pay for it.
The opening quotation is taken from the statement made by former
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in 1963 when he appeared before
the Senate Judiciary Committee to testify in favor of a federal bill which
would provide indigent defendants with the means of establishing an
adequate defense in criminal proceedings. Congress responded with the
Criminal Justice Act of 19642 which effectively eliminated these "ob-
stacles" in the federal courts. It is tragic, however, that in most of our
states those "obstacles" to an adequate defense still plague the impover-
ished defendant.
The purpose of this comment is threefold. First, it will attempt to
demonstrate the need for assistance in addition to counsel in establishing
an effective defense. Second, it will attempt to review the legislative
action which has been taken by both the federal government and the
states to provide indigent defendants with such aid in addition to counsel
as is necessary to their defense. Third, it will attempt to present alter-
native theories upon which judicial action in this area, absent the
enactment of statutes, might be predicated. In so doing, a prima facie
case for the establishment of the right to aid in addition to counsel for
indigent defendants will be developed on the bases of: (1) the due proc-
ess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments; (2) the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment; (3) the right to the
assistance of counsel guaranty of the sixth amendment; and (4) the
very nature of our judicial process.
1. Statement of Robert F. Kennedy, in Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963).
2. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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The question whether an indigent accused of a crime has a right to
ancillary assistance, furnished at government expense, evolved from the
question whether an accused was entitled to an attorney at government
expense if he could not afford one. Due to this interrelationship, a brief
review of the recognition and development of an indigent's right to
state provided counsel is necessary.
The first judicial recognition of this right occurred in 1932 when
the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama,3 ruled
that, under certain circumstances, 4 the fourteenth amendment commanded
that an accused must be provided with counsel "as a necessary requisite
of due process of law." The Court so ruled because it realized that
some defendants, due to physical impairments, ignorance, or lack of
understanding of the judicial procedure, would not receive their consti-
tutionally required opportunity to prove their innocence absent the aid
of counsel. Thus, when such individuals were unable to obtain counsel
the Court deemed it the state's duty to provide such assistance for
them. Subsequently, the Supreme Court, under the right to assistance
of counsel provision of the sixth amendment, extended the right to coun-
sel beyond capital offenses,0 to apply to any person accused of a felony
by the federal government.7 This rule was later modified to encompass
all persons accused of a serious crime in either a state or federal court ;s
and finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright,9 to arguably anyone charged with
the commission of a crime. The uncertainty of the scope of Gideon is
due to the vague language of the Court.' The difficulty concerns the
phrases "any person haled into court. . ." and "the right of one
charged with a crime. . ." which the Court used in Gideon in describing
those entitled to counsel at state expense if they could not afford it. In
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. Id. at 71. The Court ruled that:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-
mindedness, illiteracy or the like....
5. Id.
6. Id. Powell required the state to provide counsel in all cases in which the
defendant was accused of a capital offense.
7. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), was the case in which this rule was
initially proclaimed. The Court reasserted the proposition again in Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444 (1940), and Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
8. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948). The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of the seventeen year old on the grounds that he had been
deprived of due process of law. The opinion stated that while the respective justices
held differing views on the right to counsel question, all conceded
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth Amend-
ment requires counsel for all persons charged with serious crimes, when necessary
for their adequate defense, in order that such persons may be advised how to
conduct their trial.
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and
the "totality of the circumstances doctrine."
10. Note, State Not Constitutionally Obligated to Provide Counsel for Indigent
Misdemeanant, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 367 (1968); Comment, Continuing Echoes
of Gideon's Trumpet - The Indigent Defendant and the Misdemeanant; A New.
Crisis Involving the Assistance of Counsel in "A Criminal Trial," 10 S. TEx. L.J.
222 (1968).
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Douglas v. California" the Court held that the Constitution requires
that counsel be provided for an indigent convict when he appeals his
case. The right to aid of counsel, qualified by the Supreme Court to
mean "effective counsel", 12 now extends from the earliest moments of
the proceedings against the accused,' 3 through the trial, 14 and on appeal.' 5
The substantive right to counsel has expanded greatly since Powell and
has yet to reach its full potential. The courts have acknowledged the
great need of indigent defendants for appointed counsel and readily sup-
ply the same at government cost. In some cases however, even with
counsel the indigent may nonetheless go to trial with an inadequate
defense because, the exigencies of a particular case may demand assist-
ance other than that of an attorney for the development of an effective
defense.
II. NEED FOR ASSISTANCE IN ADDITION TO AN ATTORNEY
While the issue of the right to counsel was being decided by the
courts, a second issue was evolving, clearly aligned with the initial one
and likely to be equally significant. The question was raised whether
the right to counsel meant more than providing just an attorney. This
question was presented to the courts in 1951 in U.S. ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi.16 In a four-three decision the Third Circuit took the position that
the indigent defendant had no constitutional right to the aid of a state
provided psychiatrist in preparing his defense.' 7 Three dissenting judges
argued that a constitutional right to such aid in addition to an attorney
existed'" and since the petitioner had been unjustly denied that right 19
his conviction should be reversed. On appeal, the Supreme Court ignored
this issue and affirmed the circuit court's ruling,20 but a determined dis-
sent by Justice Frankfurter hinted that a constitutional right to such
11. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
12. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
13. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (identification - lineup);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (interrogation - pre-indictment) ; White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary hearing); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959) (interrogation - post-indictment).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Swensen v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). See also Morris, Poverty and Criminal Justice, 38 WASH. L. REv. 667,
707 (1963).
16. 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1951).
17. 192 F.2d at 547.
18. Biggs, C.J., noted in his dissenting opinion:
But if as here, assuming the allegation of the petition to be true, there are
grave indicia of mental disease, and it appears as well that counsel can not
prepare his client's case properly without the aid of a psychiatrist, one must
be appointed by the court if due process is to be had.
192 F.2d at 559. (Biggs, C.J., McLaughlin & Stanley, J.J., dissenting).
19. Chief Judge Biggs having noted that defendant had a right to the assistance
of a psychiatrist stated:
To deprive relator's counsel of psychiatric assistance was in fact to deprive the
relator of the benefit of counsel.
Id.
20. U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1951).
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assistance did exist by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.21 The proposition put forth by the Smith dissent was reas-
serted by Judge Jerome N. Frank in his forceful and often quoted dissent in
U.S. v. Johnson,22 wherein he stated:
We still have a long way to go to fulfill what Chief Justice Warren
has called our "mission" to achieve "equal justice under the law,"
in respect to those afflicted with poverty. In our federal courts, and
in most state courts, there is no provision by which a poor man can
get funds to pay for a pre-trial search for evidence which may be
vital to his defense and without which he may be deprived of a
truly fair trial. Furnishing him with a lawyer is not enough: The
best lawyer in the world can not competently defend an accused
person if the lawyer can not obtain existing evidence crucial to the
defense, e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator
to find a pivotal missing witness or a necessary document, or that
of an expert accountant or mining engineer or chemist. It might
indeed be argued that for the government to defray such expenses,
which the indigent accused cannot meet, is essential to that assist-
ance by counsel which the Sixth Amendment guarantees . . . . In
such circumstances, if the government does not supply the funds,
justice is denied the poor - and represents but an upper-bracket
privilege.23
The nature of our contemporary judicial proceedings makes exten-
sive pre-trial investigation and access to experts in fields outside the
law as important, indeed more important in some cases, to an adequate
defense as the appointment of an attorney.2 4  That these services are
essential to the preparation and presentation of an effective defense has
been acknowledged by both federal and state courts.2 5 For example, the
21. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion in Smith, boldly proclaimed:
A denial of adequate opportunity to sustain the plea of insanity is a denial
of the safeguard of due process in its historical procedural sense which is within
the uncontrovertible scope of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Id. at 571. (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring in dissent).
22. 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
23. Id. at 572 (footnotes omitted).
24. The importance of such assistance was attested to by former Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy. He stated that:[T]he phrase "adequate defense" means more than counsel. Equally important
to a defense are defense services. For example, the poor man cannot hire an
investigator to find witnesses and evidence which may be indispensible to his
case. He cannot retain a physician, psychiatrist, or handwriting expert.
Statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Hearings, supra note 1, at 10.
Similarly, Francis A. Allen, a widely acclaimed expert in criminal law and
Dean of the University of Michigan Law School, has said:
[A]dequate defense requires provision of services in addition to those of
counsel. . . . In many cases the lawyer, however competent, cannot supply
adequate representation without a pretrial investigation of his case to locate and
interview witnesses, secure evidence, and inform himself as to matters essential
to proper cross-examination. In some cases a full and proper defense will require
access to experts, such as psychiatrists, accountants, other specialists.
Statement of Francis A. Allen, in Hearings, supra note 1, at 146. See also Note,
Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN.
L. REv. 1054, 1055 (1963) ; Comment, Reimbursement of Expenses of Appointed
Counsel, 26 LA. L. REv. 695, 696 (1966).
25. Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1966) (ballistics expert)
United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957) (accountant); Bush v.
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services of an accountant may be of far greater value to one accused of
tax fraud than those of his attorney.26 The crucial role that a handwriting
expert plays in the defense of one accused of forgery was emphasized
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Watson.27 Similarly, there
can be little question of the significance of a blood group test in the de-
fense of the accused in a bastardy proceeding, when we consider that
the result of such a test could conclusively prove his innocence. 28 That
an indigent can be assigned counsel and still lack any meaningful defense
is most evident in situations where the defendant pleads the defense of
insanity or mental defect and, due to financial insolvency, is forced to
go to trial without the critical aid of experts in the field. In just such a
case the Supreme Court reversed an indigent's felony conviction and
remanded the case for retrial, directing the state to provide the defense
counsel with the needed experts to plead the defense effectively. 29
Court assigned defense counsel often cite as their largest problem
the securing of information upon which to construct their defense,80
thereby making investigation the most important area in which outside
assistance. is needed.8 ' The practical necessity of such pre-trial investi-
McCallum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Texas 1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1965) (psychiatrist); United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 343 (M.D. Ala.
1963) (investigator); Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N.E.2d 667(1969) (hematologist - blood group test) ; State v. Williams, 46 N.J. 427, 217 A.2d
609 (1966) (toxicologist).
26. United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957). The defendant was
being tried on an evasion of income tax charge and, considering the confusing
accounting principles involved in the government's case, the court realized that the
services of an accountant would be at least as valuable as that of accused's counsel.
27. 36 Ill. 2d 228, 230, 221 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1966). The Supreme Court of
Illinois ruled that the defendant's conviction for attempting to commit forgery by
delivery of a forged check had to be reversed because he had been denied the funds
to hire a handwriting expert to aid in his defense. In remanding for retrial the court
directed that such aid was to be made available to Watson. See also Note, Illinois
Supreme Court Announces Right of Indigent Defendant to Reasonable Fee to Hire
a Questioned Document Examiner in Attempted Forgery Case, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv.
880, 881 (1967).
28. Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959). See also
Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N.E.2d 667 (1969), in which the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts ordered the lower court to pay the cost of such a test
for impoverished defendants.
29. Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963). The Court never reached the Constitu-
tional argument raised by the petitioner, that he had a right to be furnished the
services of an independent psychiatrist, because the state agreed to a retrial as a result
of a post-conviction psychiatric examination that indicated the defendant may have
been insane for some time. This question has not been considered by the Court since
that time but it is of interest to note that in remanding the Court instructed the Texas
court to supply defense counsel with the services of a psychiatrist.
30. H.B, Steinberg and S. Weisman in ABA-ALI JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, THE PROBLEM OF A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 3-5, 35-37 (1961). See
also NEW YORK BAR COMMISSION STUDY 58-60; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION, PUBLIC DEFENDERS 12-14 (1956), cited in 47 MINN. L. REv. 1060 n.33 (1963).
31. One of the many reasons why such pre-trial investigation is best done by
someone other than the attorney is that the investigator may have to take the
witness stand - an action shunned by all attorneys - in order to impeach the
testimony of a prior witness. If an attorney does the investigating and a witness
of the state makes a statement at the trial inconsistent with one told to the attorney
earlier, the only way to impeach that witness' credibility is for the attorney to take
the stand and testify. Such action by an attorney not only runs counter to basic trial
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gation is demonstrated by the jocular but poignant statement of one at-
torney: "I am especially convinced that adequate investigation is the
key to proper defense and even 'Perry Mason' would lose once or twice,
in the absence of his 'Paul Drake'. '3 2
While we know for certain that at least some men have been ad-
judged guilty solely because they lacked the funds needed to establish
their innocence,3 3 the precise number of defendants who have been con-
victed of crime because they were poor - not because they were guilty -
is open to speculation. It has been estimated that thirty percent of
those indicted in federal courts8 4 and over fifty percent of those charged
with crimes in state courts35 are financially unable to hire counsel, let
alone pay for any services ancillary to their defense. While the Criminal
Justice Act of 196436 provides indigent defendants with such assistance
in the federal courts, only a few states have made such provisions. Since
the vast majority of indictments are brought in state courts" many of
strategy but also is inconsistent with Canon 5, §§ 9, 10, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility of the A.B.A., which states:
§ 9 - Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular case
whether he will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is both counsel and
witness, he may become more easily impeachable for interest and thus may be a
less effective witness. Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in
challenging the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an
advocate in the case. An advocate who becomes a witness is in the unseemly
and ineffective position of arguing his own credibility. The roles of an advocate
and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or
argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.
§ 10 - Problems incident to the lawyer-witness relationship arise at different
stages; they relate either to whether a lawyer should accept employment or
should withdraw from employment. Regardless of when the problem arises, his
decision is to be governed by the same basic considerations. It is not objectionable
for a lawyer who is a potential witness to be an advocate if it is unlikely that
he will be called as a witness because his testimony would be merely cumulative
or if his testimony will relate only to an uncontested issue. In the exceptional
situation where it will be manifestly unfair to the client for the lawyer to refuse
employment or to withdraw when he will likely be a witness on a contested issue,
he may serve as advocate even though he may be a witness. In making such
decision, he should determine the personal or financial sacrifice of the client
that may result from his refusal of employment or withdrawal therefrom, the
materiality of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view
of his personal involvement. In weighing these factors it should be clear that
refusal or withdrawal will impose an unreasonable hardship upon the client before
the lawyer accepts or continues the employment. Where the question arises,
doubts should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his
becoming or continuing as an advocate.
32. The statement was part of a letter, from Mr. Keller, as president of the Clay
County Bar Association, to Sen. John Eastland, voicing support for the proposed
Criminal Justice Act. Hearings, supra note 1, at 65.
33. For actual cases in which innocence was the fact, but guilty was the verdict,
see J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957) ; E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT (1932).
34. Hearings, supra note 1, at 8.
35. I. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS 7 (1965).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964). This section of the Code will be dealt with
at length in a further portion of the article. See p. 332 infra.
37. In 1969, some 2,402,979 persons were officially charged by the police in the
United States and held over to be indicted. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 102, Table 15 (1970). In a similar twelve month
period, 33,585 criminal cases were filed with the United States District Courts.
1969 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
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the persons charged with the commission of criminal acts each year
may, it appears, be financially unable to present an adequate defense.
Recognition of the need for other forms of assistance in addition to
an attorney has not been limited to the judiciary but has been acknowl-
edged by other sectors of the legal community. One select group of
attorneys has stated that one of the requisites of a public defender sys-
tem should be that "[t]he system should provide the investigatory and
other facilities necessary for a complete defense."3 8 The Special Com-
mittee report concluded that thorough investigation is essential to ade-
quate preparation of a defense and that indigents' counsel is often too
busy to perform such a time-consuming search for evidence.39 The grow-
ing consensus among attorneys that such ancillary assistance should be
provided for indigents was likewise reflected in the enumeration of
standards40 for the public defender systems adopted by both the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and Defenders As-
sociation.41
In April of 1961 the Attorney General of the United States, Robert
F. Kennedy, appointed a committee42 headed by Francis A. Allen and
comprised of highly acclaimed members of the legal profession whose
task was to consider the impact of poverty on the administration of fed-
eral criminal justice. The report of the Allen Committee 43 portrays in
depth the handicaps of the poor when they are accused of crime and
was perhaps the single most important factor in precipitating federal
legislation 44 to remedy these inequities. The extreme importance of aid
in addition to counsel is demonstrated by the observation of the Allen
Committee that:
In an indeterminate number of cases in the federal courts, the pro-
vision of adequate representation requires that a range of services,
in addition to the appointment of counsel, be made available to the
defense. These services include those of pre-trial investigation and
those of experts such as psychiatrists, accountants, and other spe-
UNITED STATES COURTS 130. The 33,585 prosecuted in federal courts for the 12 month
period is only 1.5% of the total of 2,402,979 persons indicted in all courts in the
nation in a 12 month period. Thus, apnroximately 98.5% of those brought to court
would be in non-federal jurisdictions.
38. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, EQUAL JUSTICE
FOR THE ACCUSED 58 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as the SPECIAL COMMITTEE].
39. Id. at 58-59; citing for support INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
(New York), PUBLIC DEFENDERS 21-22 (May 18, 1956).
40. The third provision of that set of standards was that every state should
"[p1rovide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense."
A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUI STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Appendix A, 67 (1967).
41. These standards for defenders systems were adopted by the National Legal
Aid and Defenders Association in October, 1959, and by the House of Delegates of
the A.B.A. in February, 1960. Id.
42. Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal
Justice (1963) [hereinafter referred to as the Allen Committee].
43. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE (1963) [hereinafter referred to as ALLEN COMM. REPORT].
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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cialists. . . . Until the present practices are rectified and such
services are made available, the procedures in the federal courts
cannot fairly be characterized as a system of adequate representation.4 5
The Allen Committee thereby indicated that the then existing federal
criminal procedure denied adequate representation to the poor because
it failed to provide for such assistance. That such auxiliary aid should
be provided to the impoverished accused as a matter of fundamental
justice had become obvious; and the pressing need for reform in the
system was equally clear. In 1963 this awareness was manifested in
action taken by both the Supreme Court and the Congress.
The more prominent criminal law decisions of the Court in that
year; Gideon v. Wainwright,46 Douglas v. California,47 and Draper v.
Washington,48 along with several other decisions of somewhat lesser
impact, 49 had the cumulative effect of drastically altering the plight of
the indigent accused. These decisions can be credited with removing
many of the barriers that previously had precluded the poor man from
equal justice under the law.
On March 8, 1963, President John F. Kennedy transmitted to the
Speaker of the House, Hon. John McCormack, a letter that called for
the passage of legislation "[t]o diminish the role which poverty plays
in our Federal system of criminal justice . ... "50 The President
further stated that the injustices that existed had survived too long
45. ALLEN COMm. REPORT, supra note 43, at 39.
46. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon required the states, under a constitutional
mandate, to provide counsel for anyone charged with a felony. The decision may
even extend the requirement to misdemeanors. See p. 324 supra.
47. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Douglas required the states to provide counsel for
every indigent appealing his conviction. This, in conjunction with the appellate right
to a free transcript as established in Griffn, made his appeal meaningful. For the first
time in our history an indigent was guaranteed the assistance and resources necessary
to give him the same chance of success on appeal that a man of financial means
always enjoyed.
48. 372 U.S. 487 (1963). The states were required by the Draper case to apply
the same appellate procedures to indigents and non-indigents and were thereby pre-
cluded from imposing additional procedural burdens on indigents because of their
financial status. The particular procedure prohibited by Draper dealt with the in-
digent defendant's obtaining a transcript of the trial proceedings. Procedure in the
state of Washington called for the defendant to request such a transcript from the
trial judge, who would provide it only after reviewing the petitioner's alleged grounds
for appeal and finding merit in them. Thus, a judge who had already ruled on these
points at trial would most likely not be inclined to find them meritorious. The Court
found such procedure unacceptable and required its abolition.
49. Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963). In Bush, the Court reversed a con-
viction because the state had failed to provide the indigent the means with which to
plead effectively the defense of insanity. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). In
Lane, the Court held that the state must grant the convicted indigent an appeal on
the merits from the denial of the writ of error coram nobis. White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963). In White, the Court reversed the petitioner's conviction for murder
because the accused was not provided with an attorney at the time of his preliminary
hearing, where he pleaded guilty. The Court ruled that the hearing was a "critical
stage" of the proceedings and therefore he should have had counsel under the rule
handed down in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
50. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2993 (1964).
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and must be removed without further delay. 51 In the First Session of
the Eighty-eighth Congress both the House and the Senate52 took up
the matter of reforming the federal provisions for aiding the indigent
accused of criminal offenses. In his appearances before the respective
committees of the House and Senate which were drafting legislation
on this matter, Attorney General Kennedy presented strong arguments
53
favoring the inclusion of a clause which would provide a means for the
impoverished defendant to acquire the additional assistance he might
require to establish his defense adequately. The action of Congress took
the form of the Criminal Justice Act of 196454 which contained, in part,
the clause for which the Attorney General had campaigned.
III. STATUTES PROVIDING FOR AID IN ADDITION TO COUNSEL
FEDERAL AND STATE
A. Federal Level
1. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964
"Insuring the poor man of a proper defense will not give him any-
thing to relieve him of his poverty. It will simply recognize his right
to equal justice."5 5 Passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 did
more than merely recognize the indigent's right to "equal justice"; it
established the means necessary to insure that "equal justice" could at
last be a reality for those to whom the words had previously been mean-
51. President John F. Kennedy stated that:
In the typical criminal case the resources of government are pitted against those
of the individual. To guarantee a fair trial under such circumstances requires
that each person have ample opportunity to gather evidence, and prepare and
present his cause. Whenever the lack of money prevents a defendant from secur-
ing an experienced lawyer, trained investigator, or technical expert an unjust
conviction may follow.
The Attorney General's accompanying letter describes the deficiencies in the
present system. These defects [referring to the defects cited in the Attorney
General's letter which accompanied his own] have prevailed for many years
despite persistent pleas for legislation by the judicial and executive branches and
the organized bar. Fairness dictates that we delay no longer.
Id. at 2993.
52. For a review and discussion of earlier bills to reform the system, see Celler,
Federal Legislative Proposals to Supply Paid Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused
of Crime, 45 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1961) ; Kutak, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
44 NEB. L. REV. 703, 711-15 (1965).
53. The tenor of Attorney General Kennedy's statement made clear the import-
ance he ascribed to providing such collateral assistance to the impoverished.
Equally important to a defense are the expert fact finding services. For example,
an innocent man may be unable to hire an investigator to find the witnesses and
evidence indispensable to his acquittal. Counsel may be unable to retain a hand-
writing expert to show that a forgery was not committed by his client.
The importance of skilled investigation is underscored in police work every-
day. The prosecuting attorney can not function without the facts. The same is
true of the defense.
Hearings on H.R. 1027 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1963). See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 10, for the
testimony before the Senate Committee in which the same arguments were asserted.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
55. Statement of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, in Hearings, supra note 1,
at 12.
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ingless rhetoric. The Act codifies the right to be represented by govern-
ment appointed counsel in both felony and misdemeanor cases arising
under federal law, upon a showing of financial inability to hire counsel. 56
Appointed counsel who represent the defendant at each stage of the pro-
ceedings from his initial appearance before the federal magistrate up
to and through appeal5 7 are compensated for their services so as to as-
sure effective representation.5" Subsection (e) of the Act, which pro-
vides for services other than counsel is the focal point of this Comment
and will be analyzed in some detail in the following paragraphs. Sub-
section (e) states:
Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investi-
gative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense
in his case may request them in an ex parte application. Upon
finding, after an appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that
the services are necessary and that the defendant is financially
unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain
the services on behalf of the defendant. The court may, in the in-
terest of justice, and upon a finding that timely procurement of neces-
sary services could not await prior authorization, ratify such services
after they have been obtained. The court shall determine reason-
able compensation for the services and direct payment to the organi-
zation or person who rendered them upon the filing of a claim for
compensation supported by an affidavit specifying the time expended,
services rendered, and expenses incurred on behalf of the defendant
and the compensation received in the same case or for the same
services from any other source. The compensation to be paid to a
person for such service rendered by him to a defendant under this
subsection, or to be paid to an organization for such services ren-
derd by an employee thereof, shall not exceed $300, exclusive of
reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred.59
This subsection removes many of the injustices that were once
visited upon the impoverished defendant in the federal courts. The use
of the words "investigative, expert or other services" makes the statute
broad enough to include any type of non-legal assistance a defendant
may require that is "necessary to an adequate defense". To have the
request for such services heard, the defendant must be merely "financially
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1964) provides:
In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or mis-
demeanor, other than a petty offense, and appears without counsel, the United
States magistrate or the court shall advise the defendant that he has the right
to be represented by counsel and that counsel will be appointed to represent him
if he is financially unable to obtain counsel.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1964) provides:
A defendant for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of
the proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States magistrate
or court through appeal.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1964). See ALLEN COMm. REPORT, supra note 43,
at 29, for an example of the disparity of performance between compensated counsel
and uncompensated counsel. See generally Note, Indigent Criminal Defendants' Con-
stitutional Right to Compensated Counsel, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 433, 441-42 (1967) ;
Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 598 (1963).
59. 18U.S.C.§3006A(e) (1964).
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unable to obtain them". Moreover, the use of this phrase and not the
word "indigent" is significant for it can encompass those who have
their own attorneys but insufficient funds to fully pay for the services
needed. Thus, the financially marginal defendant may also be eligible
for assistance under this statute. The statutory criterion of "necessary
to an adequate defense" has thus far been construed very liberally by
the courts. 60 Furthermore, while prior authorization is the general pro-
cedure, an exception exists in the event that "timely procurement of neces-
sary services could not await prior authorization" whereby the court is
able to ratify the action at a later time. Another important feature of
the provision is the relative ease with which persons rendering such
aid are able to receive their remuneration. All they need to do is submit
an affidavit "specifying the time expended, services rendered, and ex-
penses incurred . . . and the compensation received in the same case
or for the same services from any other source." While such affidavit
requirements are absolutely necessary to protect the court from paying
fraudulent claims, they are simple enough to be performed with minimal
inconvenience to the filing party."' The maximum amount of compensa-
tion for any one person rendering service under the bill - "$300, ex-
clusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred" - appears
to be a realistic limit.6 2 Rarely do the fees of such experts exceed the
statutory limit and in some cases where the cost of required services
would exceed the statutory limit if performed by one person, they can
nonetheless be obtained at government expense by merely employing a
number of people, each of whom does a portion of the work. 63 That
this section of the Act is contributing significantly to the establishment
of "equal justice for all" in the federal courts is apparent from the fact
that in the fiscal year of 1967, 333 defendants went to trial with the
resources needed to fashion adequate defenses largely because of the "in-
vestigative, expert or other services" provided by the government under
subsection (e) .64
2. Judicial Construction of Subsection (e) of the Act
As with all statutes it is the judicial interpretation and implemen-
tation of the act that determines its true worth to those for whose benefit
60. See, e.g., United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966).
In Pope the court stated that:
Itihe rule in allowing defense services is that the Judge need only be satisfied
that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their preparation,
not that the defense would be defective without such testimony (emphasis added).
61. It is important that persons rendering service under this arrangement be able
to collect with relative ease, for if they had to meet burdensome requirements the
result would be an unwillingness to work under the statute and the defendant
would suffer.
62. See SUBcOMm. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT 208 (Comm. Print 1969).
63. United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966).
64. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 62, at 208.
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it was passed. For this reason it is of considerable importance that in-
quiry be directed toward the fashion in which the Criminal Justice Act
in general, and subsection (e) in particular, have been received by the
federal courts. From the very beginning of the Act's effective existence
(August 20, 1965) the federal courts have interpreted the Act as in-
tended to provide all services that an indigent defendant would find
valuable in the preparation of his defense and which he would, no doubt,
acquire if he had the funds. A good example of this judicial liberality
can be found in United States v. Pope6" in which the District Court of
Nebraska approved requests for payment of over twelve thousand dollars
for the costs of an indigent defendant's counsel, witnesses, and expenses.
The defendant was on trial for bank robbery during the commission
of which three persons were killed. The court directed the payment of
the cost of retaining two psychiatrists and a psychologist, all of which
received the statutory maximum of $300, who administered tests to the
defendant and testified at trial in his behalf. Also permitted was the
expense of having a special court reporter transcribe a separate court
record so that the defendant could have a copy of the proceedings at the
end of each day. The cost of this service, which included three recorders
and two typists, each of whom were treated as separate entities for pur-
poses of payment, totaled $1,178.50. The remainder of the costs were
attorneys' fees, investigation costs, and miscellaneous expenses. In al-
lowing all of these expenses at government cost the court commented
that "ft]he rule in allowing defense services is that the judge need only
be satisfied that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel
in their preparation, not that the defense would be defective without
such testimony."6 6 The liberal interpretation of Pope appears to be
the rule rather than the exception in treating requests for subsection (e)
aid. In the case of United States v. Albright 7 the appellate court noted
that the district court had provided the defendant with the services of
a handwriting expert, a fingerprint expert and a psychiatrist. The offense
which he was charged with was forgery and issuing forged United States
postal money orders with the intent to defraud. It can readily be seen
from the charges lodged against the indigent that the court provided him
with all of the services he might have needed in preparing his defense.
A firm resolve to effectuate the intention of the Congress in passing
the Act appears to exist in the circuit courts as well as in the district
courts. In the recent case of United States v. Tate68 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the petitioner's convic-
tion for unlawful escape from federal custody and remanded the case
for a new trial. The sole ground for vacation of the judgment was the
65. 251 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1966).
66. Id. at 241.
67. 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
68. 419 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1969).
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failure of the district court to grant defendant's motion for a psychiatric
examination at government expense. The court of appeals stated that
such a refusal in light of the defendant's contention of insanity and the
existence of subsection (e) of the Act was intolerable. In ratifying the
acquisition of certain services by an indigent's counsel, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in United States v. Sisk6 9
summarized the view that the federal courts have adopted in reference
to the Act:
It is contemplated by the [Criminal Justice] Act that counsel should
be afforded the fullest opportunity to prepare their case. The rule
in allowing defense services is that the Judge need only be satisfied
that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their
preparation.. 70
Not only have the federal courts been liberal in providing indigent
defendants with the types of non-counsel assistance referred to in the
Act, but they have also allowed the retention of some unusual forms
of aid pursuant to the "other services" provision of subsection (e). The
case of United States v. Baker7' is illustrative of this type of assistance.
The witness who identified defendant Baker at the trial as being the
gunman in the hijacking had stated prior to trial that he could not be
certain of the defendant's identity until he saw him face to face and
felt that he could not readily differentiate one negro from another. With
the normal pre-trial lineup for identification having been cancelled, the
witness' first confrontation with the defendant was at the trial. Since
the defendant was the only nonjuror negro in the courtroom the judge
suggested that counsel might mitigate this disadvantage by retaining
other negroes to sit in the courtroom and, seating the defendant among
them, request that the witness be asked to pick him out of the group.
The judge further suggested that the cost of these stand-ins could be
obtained from the government under the authorization of subsection (e)
that "other services" may be provided to indigent defendants.
From the cases noted it is apparent that the courts of the federal
judicial system are willing to provide an indigent defendant with prac-
tically anything provided there exists some minimal nexus between the
request and the adequate preparation of his defense. That in fiscal 1969
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts disbursed $423,44172
in payment for "investigative, expert or other services" rendered to in-
digent defendants is clear proof that the intention of Congress in in-
cluding subsection (e) in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 is being
fostered on the federal level.
69. 309 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
70. Id.
71. 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969).
72. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 332, Table No. 2 (1970).
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B. State Level
While the problem of providing indigent defendants with the means
to fashion a defense has, for the most part, been resolved in the federal
system by statutory enactment, it still exists on the state level. Conse-
quently, the vast majority of impoverished defendants may still be sub-
jected to the injustices discussed earlier since most of the criminally
accused are tried in state tribunals. 78
Eight states; notably Pennsylvania, New York, and Vermont, have
recognized the shortcomings of their criminal justice systems and have
adopted statutes which in part resemble subsection (e) of the Criminal
Justice Act.74 These states are clearly forerunners among non-federal
jurisdictions in affording the poor an equal chance to contend with their
accuser. A number of other states, including Illinois, have authorized
public defender systems, most of whose enabling statutes contain clauses
such as "and shall pay out of the county treasury for necessary office,
travel and other expenses incurred in the defense of cases." 75 This statu-
tory language is broad enough to be interpreted as a grant to the public
defender systems to employ experts at state expense. However, other
state statutes creating defender systems make no provision for "ex-
penses ' ' 7 and thereby on their face preclude the retaining of ancillary
services. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, these organized defender sys-
tems do have the ability to carry out limited pre-trial investigation.77 A
fourth category is comprised of states that have statutes providing solely
for the appointment of counsel from the rolls of the various bar organi-
zations within the state. Of these states, five have statutes providing
compensation for the attorney's services and reimbursement for the ex-
penses incurred ;78 nine others provide compensation only for the services
of the advocate;79 while a few still request gratuitous legal service.80
It is apparent that a large number of our states have no specific statu-
tory provisions making these ancillary services available to the indigent.
73. See note 36 supra.
74. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-852(a) (Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26,§ 12-B (Supp. 1969) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (Supp. 1969); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 604-A:6 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-22-3(A) (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. COUNTY LAWS § 722-C (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 791(Supp. 1969) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-64-1(3) (Supp. 1969) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,§ 6503(d) (Supp. 1969).
75. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 5607 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
76. See, e.g., ARiM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-581-6 (Supp. 1969).
77. The defenders do as much pre-trial investigation as their busy schedule will
allow and are sometimes aided in their efforts by the prosecuting attorney who may
give the defenders some information they obtained in their preparations.
78. IowA CODE ANN. § 775:5 (Supp. 1970) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277,
§ 56 (1959); MIcr. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 775.16 (1968); S.D. CoMp. LAWS tit. 23,§ 2:2 (Supp. 1970) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10:01:110 (Supp. 1969)
79. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43:2406 (1947); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 705-5 (1968);
KAN. STAT. ANN. 62:1304 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:141 (Supp. 1970); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:810 (Supp. 1970); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95:1005 (Rep.
Vol. 8, 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.51 (Page Supp. 1969); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 62-3-1 (Supp. 1969); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-9 (Supp. 1969).
80. Mo. REV. STAT. § 545:820 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29:13:03 (1960);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2003 (1955).
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While rules of court do not have the pervasive effect of statutes,
they can accomplish similar results within their applicable jurisdiction.
For this reason the rules of court pertinent to the rights of indigents
would be rather significant. Unfortunately, the extreme difficulty attached
to gaining access to the rules of court in the hundreds of jurisdictions
in the United States effectively precludes determination of how many
jurisdictions, if any, have procedural rules which call for non-counsel
assistance for indigent defendants. 81
C. Prospects for Future Development-Legislative
and Judicial
The lack of any provision in most states to either furnish such non-
legal assistance to indigent defendants or reimburse counsel for expenses
incurred in obtaining such aid is a serious problem. In considering this
situation Judge Jerome N. Frank argues:
This is not democratic justice. It makes a farce of "equality be-
fore the law", one of the first principles of a democracy. Unless we
can solve the problem, we must acknowledge that, in denying justice
to under-incomed persons, we are "selling justice. '8 2
Court-appointed counsel that serve without compensation pursuant to
state law,8 3 must retain any non-legal aid they deem necessary for the
preparation of the defense at their own expense, a sacrifice some are
unwilling to make.8 4  Nor are the attorneys from the public defender
offices much better off; underbudgeted from the start, these organiza-
tions have little money available for "extras. '8 5 There is a very real
possibility that any accused being defended under these conditions could
be seriously prejudiced.8 6 The diversity of the states' positions on this
important issue of whether or not a defendant is to be provided the
means of conducting an adequate defense is disturbing. If indeed the
indigent has an inadequate defense without such aid, the procedures
for providing aid to indigents in most states would represent a grave
travesty of justice.
81. There is no compilation of the rules of court for the thousands of city, county,
and state judiciaries. This fact in conjunction with the general lack of availability
of these rules outside of their respective jurisdictions prohibits any investigation on
this plane.
82. Frank, Today's Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D.
93, 101 (1954).
83. See note 80 & p. 336 supra.
84. SILVERSTEIN, upra note 35, at 16-17. The accused is often represented by a
young attorney who is financially limited in his efforts. Ervin, Uncompensated
Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963).
85. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 35, at 45.
86. In considering this point the Allen Committee declared:
This failure [to provide for aid in addition to counsel] may adversely affect the
quality of the defense made or force a decision to plead guilty to a criminal
charge in situations in which the charge might otherwise be properly contested.
ALLEN COMM. REPORT, supra note 43, at 39.
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The fact that a defendant's lack of money could result in his in-
ability to produce a defense sufficient to counteract the state's charge
of guilt, taken in conjunction with the position of the Supreme Court in
Griffin v. Illinois,8 7 that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has" raises the
question whether there is any basis for judicial action on this problem.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has ruled that there exists a constitu-
tional right to aid in addition to counsel and ordered that it be pro-
vided s8 at state expense if necessary. Unfortunately, New Jersey stands
alone in its judicial determination that the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Constitution means the right to more than just an attorney. The
nonexistence of any trend among the state legislatures or judiciaries to
remove this inequality makes judicial action, on the federal level, the
most probable vehicle of reform.
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES UPON WHICH JUDICIAL ACTION
MIGHT BE PREDICATED
There are several sound arguments, based upon both the constitu-
tion and the nature of the judicial process, which lend support to the
proposition that in some cases viz, those in which aid in addition to
counsel is necessary to an adequate defense, the indigent defendant has
a right to such aid. The constitutional protections of due process, equal
protection, and right to counsel as well as the very core of American
justice - the adversary system - can be interpreted as requiring assist-
ance above and beyond counsel. It should be noted, however, that the
passage of the Criminal Justice Act renders these points largely moot
as applied to the federal system. Nonetheless, the significance of these
arguments should not be minimized since the states are the primary dis-
pensaries of criminal justice.
A. Due Process
The due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States,
binding upon the federal government by the 5th Amendment and the
state governments by the 14th Amendment, may provide the means
whereby courts could remedy the infirmities of the present system. Both
of these amendments state that government may not deprive any person
"of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
There is no concise definition, of "due process of law." Rather, it is
a phrase which embodies an obligation of fairness or equity in the man-
ner in which government conducts its affairs. The essence of due process
87. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
88. In State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961), the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey ruled that "the constitutional obligation to furnish counsel to an indigent
can sensibly only be construed to include as well that which is necessary to proper
defense in addition to the time and professional efforts of an attorney. . . ." Id. at 526,
170 A.2d at 9.
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lies, therefore, in the requirements and prohibitions placed on judicial
action via the implementation of the concept which the phrase "due
process of law" embodies. For example, the Court in Betts v. Brady8 9
took the position that "the conviction and incarceration of one whose
trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right" 90 was prohibited by due process. It is well to note the words of
Justice Frankfurter who, in considering the due process issue in the
case of Rochin v. California,9 stated:
Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes
defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more
precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by
methods that offend "a sense of justice. '92
Though there be no concrete definition of due process, reflections upon
the question of what it represents seem to polarize around notions of
what is "fair" and "unfair. '98
Most of the cases defining the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants have been decided under the due process clauses. The first
such case was Powell v. Alabama 4 in which the court ruled that due
process under the 14th Amendment required the state to provide coun-
sel for the accused in every capital case where the defendant was unable
to hire counsel. There followed from Powell a number of cases which
broadened the category of offenses for which the court was required to
provide counsel in order to meet the due process test.05 The requisite
of due process has been applied in the area of investigation as well as
in the elicitation of confessions. In Rochin the Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction because it was obtained by methods that offended
due process of law.96 Similarly, the due process clause has been invoked
to bar the use of evidence secured in an illegal search.97 Confessions
which have been coerced from the accused are precluded from use as
evidence9" under the same principles. The Supreme Court in each of
89. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
90. Id. at 473.
91. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
92. Id. at 173.
93. A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-15 (1967), citling: FELLMAN, THE
DEFENDER'S RIGHTS 4-5 (1958); HART, THE CONCEPTS OF LAW 154 (1961); KAHN,
ed., THE GREAT RIGHTS 43-63 (1963); MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 99(1955).
94. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
95. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (all felonies); Uveges v. Pennsyl-
vania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (all serious crime) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335(1963) ("any person haled into court").
96. The defendant was handcuffed and taken to a hospital where an emetic
solution was forced into his stomach and caused him to vomit. The vomited matter
contained two capsules of morphine which were used as evidence at the trial. Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).97. This rule was first promulgated in the federal courts in the case of Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and later made binding upon state courts in the
case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
98. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959).
COMMENTS
17
Alexander: Assistance in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Defendants: The Ne
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
these instances felt that the minimal standards which are of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty had been transgressed.
Mr. Justice Burton speaking in Joint Anti-Facist Committee v. Mc-
Grath9 expressed the idea that:
Due Process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick.
It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably
involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitu-
tion entrusted with the unfolding of the process.'00
In the past fifteen years the exercise of judgment by the Supreme Court
has led to considerable "adjustment" in the concepts of what is "fair"
and "reasonable" in the conducting of criminal proceedings.
A trend toward the granting of tools in addition to counsel for
the presentation of an adequate defense, might well be said to have
begun with the case of Griffin v. Illinois,101 in which the Court ruled
that on appeal the state must furnish all indigent defendants with
a transcript of the lower court proceedings free of charge. In so
ruling the Court announced that both the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment precluded the state from
granting appellate review in such a way as to discriminate against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty. 10 2 Under Illinois law,
at that time, in order to get a full direct appellate review of alleged
errors' 03 it was necessary for the defendant to furnish the appellate court
with a bill of exception or report of proceedings at the trial certified by
the trial judge. The state had conceded that at times it was impossible
to prepare such documents without a transcript of the trial proceedings.
There was no provision, however, to provide indigent defendants, other
than those convicted of murder, with such transcripts in the event they
could not afford to purchase them. Thus, the Supreme Court found,
that while the state had provided all convicted defendants an appeal as
of right, impoverished defendants were in fact precluded from exercising
this right' 04 in some cases. In the Court's view this constituted invidious
99. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
100. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
101. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
102. Id. at 17. See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), in which
the Supreme Court held Washington's procedure of review was violative of the
fourteenth amendment, because it required the indigent defendant to go through a
preliminary examination of the merits of his appeal in order to obtain a free transcript.
103. Illinois law at that time stated that "a writ of error in all criminal cases are
[sic] writs of right and shall be issued of course." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1(1955) (repealed 1963). Thus, the appeal via writ of error was an appeal as of right,
guaranteed to all convicted of criminal activity.
104. The trial court denied petitioner's motion requesting the court to provide
him with a transcript of the proceedings below. In so doing they rejected petitioner's
argument that a denial of the transcript would be invidious discrimination, based on
poverty, in the administration of the right of appeal. Griffin then filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act No. 630[1949] Laws of Ill. 722 (repealed 1963). He claimed that there were nonconstitu-
tional errors at trial which entitled him to have his conviction set aside on appeal.
Petitioner stated that his lack of a transcript impeded appellate review of his case
and the state's refusal to provide it was a violation of the due process and equal
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discrimination in violation of both the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Later, the Court in Douglas v.
California,05 again looking to both the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, ruled that the state must provide
the convicted indigent with counsel in his first appeal of right. The
California procedure required the indigent defendant to apply to the
District Court of Appeals of California for the assignment of counsel
to assist him in his appeal as of right. That court would make an inde-
pendent investigation of the record and decide whether it would be ad-
vantageous to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have
counsel appointed. Thus the question of whether or not the defendant
was to be assisted by counsel on appeal was decided in an ex parle pro-
ceeding, on the basis of the court's opinion as to the value of such
assistance.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority stated that "where the merits
of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided with-
out the benefit of counsel . . . an unconstitutional line has been drawn
between rich and poor."' 0 6  The gravity of this unconstitutional dis-
parity in treatment was noted by Justice Douglas as follows:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit
of counsel's examination of the record, research of the law, and
marshalling arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without
merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record
is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a mean-
ingless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal. 10 7
Read together, Griffin and Douglas indicate that the Supreme Court is
cognizant of the direct effect poverty has on the fairness and reasonable-
ness of criminal procedure.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Powell, Johnson, Griffin,
Gideon, and Douglas all have the result of recognizing that an indigent
must not be prejudiced by his poverty. Former Attorney General Rogers
distilled the essence of the Court's thinking in these decisions when he
stated:
We are at a stage in our history, and in the development of our
concept of justice, when we must assure an adequate defense for
every person accused of crime regardless of his financial means.
In our legal system . . .poverty must never be allowed to prevent
justice.10 8
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The trial court dismissed this peti-
tion and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that no substantial state or
federal constitutional issue had been raised. Petitioner having thus exhausted his
state remedies, petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari.
105. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Court based its ruling on both the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
106. 372 U.S. at 357.
107. Id. at 357-58.
108. Statement of Former Attorney General Rogers, in Hearings, supra note 1,
at 31.
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Considering this attitude of the Court and the essential role of expert
witnesses and pre-trial investigations in developing an adequate de-
fense,10 9 it is conceivable that the Court may require that such services
be provided the indigent defendant.
It is submitted that the failure to provide an indigent defendant with
the non-legal assistance essential to an adequate defense while guaran-
teeing him an attorney to present an inadequate defense coupled with
the guarantee of an adequate appeal is illogical, "offends a sense of jus-
tice"' 10 and is "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fair-
ness and right.""' In short, this deprivation constitutes a violation of
due process.
B. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment declares
that "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The equal protection clause, like the
due process clauses, eludes definition." 2 It is a protection that repre-
sents an amorphous concept of governmental responsibility. The goal
of equal protection is to,secure every person within the state's juris-
diction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occa-
sioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents." 3 It matters not whether the offensive
situation is imposed as a result of statutory enactment or administrative
procedure for the injustices wrought are indistinguishable in their impact.
The substantive embodiment of the concept of equal protection or
equality of protection is contingent upon which of the two basic notions
of equality, numerical or proportional, is brought to bear on the issue.
"The principle of distribution according to a numerical equality con-
cedes that human beings are diverse and unequal in most respects; it
nevertheless concludes that all such differences are irrelevant for pur-
poses of distributing benefits and burdens among members of society.' 1 4
For example, the right to vote in an election extends equally to all who
meet the established requirements without any concern for other per-
sonal differences such as income, health, or stature. Conversely, "[t]he
principle of proportional ...equality does take cognizance of differences
109. See pp. 325-31 supra.
110. See p. 339 supra.
IIl. See p. 339 supra.
112. "Equal protection" is a term as undefinable as "due process"; but statements
of what it encompasses seem to center on the theme of like treatment for all, e.g.,
"equal protection of the laws" simply means that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike. Derman v. Ingraham, 47 Misc. 2d 346, 262 N.Y.S.2d 533, 536 (1956).
"Equal protection of the laws" in the sense used in the fourteenth amendment implies
that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to courts for relief under like conditions
and without discrimination. Communist Party of the United States v. Moysey, 141
F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
113. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp 247 U.S 350, 352 (1918).
114. Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rtv. 1065,
1165 (1969).
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among men and may require numerically different treatment because of
-those differences." 115 An example of proportional equality can be found
in the income tax which is levied on all but the personal differences
among men including: income, -health, age, number of persons being
supported, etc., which are taken into account in assigning each persons
share of the burden.
Traditionally, equal protection has been a matter of numerical
equality, requiring that each person within a particular classification
be treated the same. Aside from that consideration the only other
factor which the Court has inquired into is the validity of the legislative
scheme's defining the designated group. The Court has not, tradi-
tionally, concerned itself with whether certain members of a group, due
to particular personal circumstances, should have been treated differ-
ently. 116 Recent decisions, however, have seen the Court transcend the
traditional standard and instruct states that certain differences among
men must be taken into account when the legislature or judiciary act
in a fashion that affect individual's rights. One such area is criminal
procedure. In effect, the Supreme Court has directed that proportional
equality is required and that financial inequality must be compensated
for by the system. Both Douglas and Griffin exemplify this position and
while the Court did not use the label of proportional equality it is evident
that this is the standard they required in appellate review.11 7
It was primarily upon the constitutional mandate of "equal pro-
tection" that the Supreme Court based its decision in Gri.iln. Writing
for the majority, Mr. Justice Black stated that "in criminal trials a State
can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race, or color. 11 8 He contended that, by analogy, any appellate
procedure that permitted access to the court only after the payment of
fees would likewise be an invidious discrimination against the poor and
a contravention of the Constitution.1 9  The language of the Court in
this decision clearly lends itself to the proposition that poverty must
not be permitted to preclude the exercise of the accused's rights12 0 and
that all must "stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every
American court."'121 The Douglas Court manifested the same awareness
that poverty may have the deleterious effect of precluding the afflicted
party from exercising his rights in any meaningful fashion. In Douglas
the Court proclaimed that an indigent defendant must be provided with
the assistance of counsel in his first appeal as of right. The Court
115. Id. at 1166.
116. Id. at 1171.
117. Id. at 1179-80.
118. 351 U.S. at 17.
119. Id. at 18.
120. No other meaning could be attached to the Court's statement that:
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial o man gets depends onthe amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
apoellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.
Id. at 19.
121. Id. at 17, citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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equated the situation in Griffin to that in Douglas and found that "[iln
either case the evil is the same: Discrimination against the indigent."'1 22
This discrimination was branded as being a violation of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. While both of these cases factually
dealt with appellate review, the rationale employed by the Court in de-
ciding them is equally applicable to the trial level. It has been suggested
by some commentators that Griffin-Douglas provide a sound basis from
which other benefits could be granted the indigent defendant. 128 In light
of this proposition it is relevant to note that proportional equality has
also been established by the courts as the standard in the areas of politi-
cal rights 124 and education. 125
These decisions indicate the growing concern of the courts over
the unequal protection now afforded to some because of the states' lack
of consideration of the personal differences of their citizens. It has finally
become apparent that certain characteristics and differences among the
people constituting the group to which a law or right is applicable will
drastically affect the degree or manner in which some of the group are
able to avail themselves of the said law or right. In some cases these
differences may result in a denial of the benefit or privilege of the law
or rule. The indigent defendant can be considered such a person who,
belonging to the group comprised of the criminally accused, has certain
rights and privileges but because of his personal difference - indigency -
may in reality be denied the exercise of these rights or privileges. For
example, all persons accused of criminal activity have the right to present
witnesses in their favor, as well as to bring forth all evidence in their
favor, yet the indigent's lack of money may well prevent him from un-
covering such evidence of summoning witnesses to his aid. Application
of the proportional theory of equality would achieve a result in which
each person accused of a crime would have the same real or actual as
opposed to theoretical rights and privileges.
122. 372 U.S. at 355.
123. Kamisar & Choper, The Right To Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1. 8 (1963).
124. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Education, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In this
case the Court struck down a poll tax of $1.50/person which had been levied indis-
criminately on all voters. The Court declared it unconstitutional as a violation of the
equal protection clause, because the tax had no relation to standards designed to
promote intelligent use of the ballot and was in fact an invidious discrimination
against the poor. Thus the Court outlawed a statute because of the varying effect
it had on people of different income levels.
125. See, e.g., Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D.
Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). The district court
found that a racial imbalance, resulting from a non-discriminatory districting plan in
the schools led to lower achievement levels by minorities. The court ruled that the
equal protection clause was violated by this failure to provide equal educational
opportunity. Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub non.,
Smuch v. Hanson, No. 21,167 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 21, 1969). This court ordered the
local school district to initiate compensatory programs for the disadvantaged minorities
and to take positive steps to eliminate racial imbalance. The court so moved because
the current policies, while not shown to be discriminatory, affected the educational
opportunities of minorities in an adverse fashion.
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The Court in Griffin and Douglas required that once a state, has
decided to allow an appeal, it must do so in a manner that will not
prejudice those without funds. Based upon the same reasoning, it seems
that once a state initiates prosecution of a person this same equal pro-
tection guarantee should require that every person have an equal op-
portunity to maintain their innocence regardless of their financial re-
sources. It is submitted that this argument must be answered in the
affirmative.
The Allen Committee 126 in their consideration of the obligation of
the government to provide "equal justice" addressed itself to the same
inquiry:
Duties arise from action. When a course of conduct, however legiti-
mate, entails the possibility of serious injuries to persons, a duty on
the actor to avoid the reasonably avoidable injuries is ordinarily
recognized. When government chooses to exert its powers in the
criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking
reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant
to the just administration of the law but which, nevertheless may
occasionally affect determinations of the accused's liability or penalty.
While government may not be required to relieve the accused of his
poverty, it may properly be required to minimize the influence of
poverty on its administration of justice.127
It would seem as though the Supreme Court fulfilled just such a
"requirement to minimize the influence of poverty" in deciding Griffin
and Douglas. Given this recent history of the Court in the criminal pro-
cedure area 128 and the "requirement" to eradicate the effect of poverty
in our criminal proceedings, it is submitted that the recognition of a
right to aid in addition to counsel, pursuant to the demands of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, is imminent.
C. Right To Counsel
One of the more persuasive arguments in support of the position
that an indigent accused has a right to such ancillary aid is grounded
upon the provision of the sixth amendment which states that "in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy . . . the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." The Supreme Court held in Gideon that recog-
126. See note 42 supra.
127. ALLEN COMM. REPORT, supra note 43. at 9.
128. In its per curiam opinion in Roberts v. LaVallee, the Court reviewed its
decisions in the area over the past 10 years.
Our decisions for more than a decade now have made clear that differences in
the access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon
the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution. See,
e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12(1956) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961). To interpose any financial
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a
state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of
the laws.
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967).
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nition of this right was obligatory on the states vis-a-vis the fourteenth
amendment.
The assistance of counsel clause has been interpreted in both fed-
eral12 9 and state' 30 courts to mean "effective" assistance of counsel.
Initially many courts narrowly interpreted this right as meaning a right
to assistance by competent counsel. 13' Subsequent decisions, however,
indicate that the courts now recognize effective assistance of counsel to
require more than just a competent attorney. One such case, In re
Branch,'3 2 took the position that the constitutional right to counsel con-
templated effective aid in preparation and trial of the case. Similarly, in
United States v. Germany'3 3 the court ruled that the constitutional man-
date of effective assistance of counsel required that counsel be given
an "opportunity" to prepare the case and that this opportunity meant
more than just time. Furthermore, this court considered the funds to
prepare a defense as "[an essential ingredient to an attorney effectively
representing a defendant in a criminal case.' u ' 4 The critical part that
pre-trial investigation plays in meeting the standard of "effective assist-
ance" of counsel is indicated by the action of the court in Cross v. United
States.13 When it came to the court's attention that the indigent de-
fendant's attorney had neglected pre-trial investigation,'5 6 the case was
remanded for a hearing on the question of the effectiveness of the assist-
ance of counsel. The belief that effective assistance of counsel requires
more than just the appointment of an attorney is becoming more pre-
valent.'8 7
129. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; Coplon v. United States, 191
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1951); Goodwin v. Page, 296 F.
Supp. 1205 (E.D. Okla.), aff'd, 418 F.2d 867 (1969).
130. See, e.g., Thessen v. State, 454 P.2d 341 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1029 (1970); Holbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1969); State v. Kendall - .....
Iowa -----. 167 N.W.2d 909 (1969) ; People v. Avilez, 86 Cal. App. 2d 289, 194 P.2d
829 (1948).
131. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Dayton v. United States, 319 F.2d 742 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 947 (1963) ; Melton v. People, 157 Colo. 169, 401 P.2d
605 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1914 (1966) ; Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky.
1963) ; State v. Demry, 260 Minn. 173, 109 N.W.2d 587 (1961).
132. 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969). The court stated that the attorney
owes his client the duty of investigating carefully crucial defenses of fact that may
be available.
133. 32 F.R.D. 343 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
134. Id. at 344. The court also stated that "the effective assistance of counsel"
mandate required that funds for reasonably necessary travel and subsistence in prepara-
tion for trial be made available to defense counsel by the government. Id.
135. 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968). For other cases, see People v. Fields, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (1969) ; State v. Gordon, 4 Md. App. 78, 241 A.2d 169 (1968) ; People v.
Crawford, 16 Mich. App. 92, 167 N.W.2d 814 (1969).
136. The attorney stated that his failure to investigate was due to the fact he
had not been paid. On remand, the court was also to determine if the attorney should
be dropped from the roles.
137. See, e.g., NEDRUD, TnIE CRIMINAL LAW 1968, Commentary 53 (1968), where
the author pointed out that "[p]reparation and investigation aids serve to make
counsel effective. Denial of effective counsel may result from counsel's lack of expert
assistance .... ." Former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in discussing the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 stated that the defense standard of the Act recognized
that adequate representation in a criminal case involves more than an attorney alone.
[VOL.. 16
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized the existence of a
constitutional right to aid in addition to an attorney in State v. Horton. s3 8
This court took the position that "[tlhe Constitutional obligation to fur-
nish counsel to an indigent can sensibly only be construed to include as
well that which is necessary to a proper defense in addition to the time
and professional efforts of an attorney . .."189 Similarly, the State of Illi-
nois in People v. Watson140 acknowledged the constitutional right of one
accused of attempted forgery to be provided with a reasonable fee to hire
an expert document examiner to aid in his defense. 141 Furthermore,
there are several other cases in which this right, though not openly de-
clared to exist, has been nonetheless recognized by the courts' conduct
in providing auxiliary aid.1 42 It has been suggested that by following
the rationale of the court in Watson, a right to funds for retaining non-
legal assistance in state courts could be based upon the sixth amend-
ment.' 48 The creation of such a right would not be an illogical or strained
extension of Gideon since the existence of such aid is often essential to
make the "assistance of counsel" effective.1 44
The constitutional right to aid in addition to counsel came one step
closer to fruition with the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Greer v.
Beto.14' The court remanded the case for further proceedings to de-
termine if Greer had been accorded the "effective assistance of counsel"
guaranteed him by the sixth amendment. Of prime consideration in the
court's eyes was the fact that Greer's appointed counsel had failed to
present any medical testimony, at his trial for burglary, on the critical
issue of sanity. The court noted that this vacuum may have been caused
by the fact that "Texas authorities seem to hold that an indigent de-
fendant is not entitled to psychiatric examination at the expense of the
state."'1 46 The court went on from there to state that "fsjuch Texas
Kennedy. The Dep't of Justice and the Indigent Accused, 47 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y
182-84 (1964).
138. 34 N.J. 518. 170 A.2d 1 (1961).
139. Id. at 527. 170 A.2d at 9 (emnhasis added).
140. 36 I1. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
141. This ruling seemed to be based on Article 2, Section 9, of the Illinois Con-
stitution which states "accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel," but may have been based on that court's interpretation of the federal
constitution's sixth amendment right of "assistance of counsel." See Note, Illinois
Subreme Court Announces Right of Indigent Defendant to Reasonable Fee to Hire
a Questioned Document Examiner in Attempted Forgery Case, 18 SYRACUsE L. Rv.
880, 881 (1967).
142. See note 25 supra.
143. Note, supra note 141, at 882.
144. That such assistance is necessary to make counsel "effective" has been asserted
by commentators such as Francis A. Allen who noted that:[Aldequate defense requires provision of services in addition to those of coun-
sel. . . .In many cases, the lawyer, however competent, cannot supply adequate
representation without a pretrial investigation of his case to locate and interview
witnesses, secure relevant evidence, and inform himself as to matters essential toproper cross examination. In some cases a full and proper defense will require
access to experts such as psychiatrists, accountants, or other specialists.
Statement of Francis A. Allen, in Hearings, supra note 1, at 146.
145. 379 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967).
146. Id. at 925. The court was referring to whether this rule had a bearing on the
defense counsel's failure to introduce any medical evidence to support the plea of
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policy may not, however, avoid the federal constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel.' 47  It is thus evident that this court
considered the assistance of a psychiatrist as being essential to "effective
assistance of counsel", in some cases, and that state policy denying
such assistance would not be tolerated.
It is submitted that a fair distillation of the above cases yields the
conclusion that effective assistance of counsel requires more than mere
appointment of an attorney and that the trend seems to be in the direction
of insuring that the indigent receives an adequate defense. 14
There has arisen within the area of constitutional law a doctrine
known as the "same standards" rule. Its genesis can be traced back to
Gideon, where the Supreme Court stated:
We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the
first eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded
against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused
to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution. 149
That the right to assistance of counsel is of a fundamental nature and
was a continuous thread running through the opinion. Less than two
years later, the Court in Pointer v. Texas,150 ruled that the sixth amend-
ment's right to confront witnesses was a "fundamental right" and obli-
gatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Pointer
Court concluded that this "right" must be "enforced against the states
under the fourteenth amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment."' 51 In the
recent case of Duncan v. Louisiana,152 Justice White in delivering the
opinion of the Court stated:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental
to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee. 158
In Duncan the Court held that the petitioner had a right to a jury trial
since he was being prosecuted for a crime which was punishable by
fine and up to two years in prison. This right to jury trial in all serious
insanity, the failure of which was ruled to establish a prima facie case of ineffec-
tive counsel.
147. Id.
148. See note 137 supra.
149. 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963), citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 243-44 (1936).
150. 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The Court in Pointer was very definitive in its
statement of the holding:
We hold today that the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
151. Id. at 406, citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (emphasis added).
152. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
153. Id. at 149.
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crimes was held to be a part of the sixth amendment's guarantees and
made binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
Court noted "that in the American States, as in the federal judicial
system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental
right .... ,,154 It is important to note that the Supreme Court once
again seized upon a "fundamental right" and then determined that the
state courts are to apply the "same standards" for its implementation as
those applied in the federal courts.
If the state courts are to be held to the "same standards" as the
federal courts with respect to the "fundamental rights" of confronting
the witnesses against an accused, as well as a jury trial, it seems justifi-
able to conclude that the "same standards" rule should likewise apply
to other "fundamental rights" made obligatory on the states by the four-
teenth amendment. Under this proposition the fundamental right to
"assistance of counsel" in a state court should convey the same mean-
ing it does in a federal court. The current standard for implementing
the fundamental right to "assistance of counsel" in the federal juris-
dictions is set forth in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 and encom-
passes the collateral right to aid in addition to an attorney. 1' In es-
tablishing this operating procedure for the federal courts Congress had
no intention of affecting state procedures Notwithstanding this fact,
however, the Supreme Court could conceivably declare that the "same
standards" rule required the states to follow the federal standard for
implementing the "fundamental right" of "assistance of counsel" in state
courts. In so doing, the Court might take the position that a Constitu-
tional right to aid in addition to appointed counsel exists and that part
of the federal standard is sub-section (e) of the Act which provides for
such assistance.
A valid objection to this line of reasoning lies in the fact that the
standard for the "assistance of counsel" in the federal courts is of legis-
lative origin. In all of the cases to date in which the Supreme Court
has applied the rule the standard imposed upon the states had earlier
been proclaimed by the Court to be Constitutionally required in the
federal courts. Thus the Court was merely extending an already exist-
ing constitutional requirement to the state courts to insure uniform
observance of "fundamental rights". The Court had never dealt directly
with the issue of a constitutional right to aid in addition to counsel prior
to the enactment of the statutory standard and the existence of said
statute made the issue a moot one in federal jurisdictions. This being
154. Id. at 157.
155. In an article in the Journal of the American Judicature Society, Robert F.
Kennedy reported that:
[IT]he bill establishes an adequate defense standard under which representation
in a criminal case is recognized as involving more than a lawyer alone. It requires
making available to counsel those auxiliary investigative, expert and other services
frequently essential to ascertaining the facts and making the judgments upon
which to prepare and present the defendant's case.
Kennedy, supra note 137, at 182-83.
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the case it is arguable that the standard, as set out by sections (b) & (e)
of the Criminal Justice Act, 156 is not a true standard for the purposes
of the "same standards" rule because the Court has never proclaimed
it to be constitutionally required. Neither logic nor precedent, however,
preclude the Court from ruling that the standard set forth by the statute
is in fact what the Constitution would require the federal courts to do
in the Act's absence. Such a determination would only come to pass in
deciding a case on appeal from a state court, the issue being moot in
federal jurisdictions, and once made the Court could employ the "same
standards" rule to require the states to abide by the constitutionally
required and statutorily promulgated federal standard in treating the
"fundamental right" of "assistance of counsel".
D. The Nature Of The Adversary System
The judicial process itself generates one final argument in support
of the right to ancillary assistance for the accused. This country long
ago made the fundamental decision to employ the adversary process in
the adjudication of disputes because it was deemed the most effective
way of arriving at the proper decision. In order for this process to
operate effectively, i.e., to bring out all of the true facts and resolve the
issue based on those findings of fact, the parties must be nearly equal
in legal, investigative and expert resources. 57 This equality of contend-
ing forces is essential because the decision of the court is based solely
upon the evidence presented at the trial. Clearly, if one party is able
to thoroughly investigate the issue, employ experts to testify, and hire
an attorney; while the opposition's poverty precludes him from all aid
except the assistance of appointed counsel, the outcome could be de-
termined, at least indirectly by the financial status of the litigants.
Today, in large measure, just such a gross inequality of parties
exists when the state prosecutes an indigent defendant.5 8 Furthermore,
this inequality between the prosecution and the defense tends to impair
the integrity as well as the effectiveness of the adversary system.'5" It
is well recognized that in the operation of our system of criminal justice
the defense function is equally as essential as the prosecution. 160 Coun-
sel for the impoverished must be supplied with resources comparable to
those employed by the prosecution if he is to have a chance at winning.161
156. These sections of § 3006A provide the indigent defendant with both counsel
and other forms of aid necessary to prepare an adequate defense.
157. Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity
Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061 (1962) ; Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel
for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1065 (1963).
158. Trebach, New England Defender Systems: Basic Problems and Questions,
47 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 170, 174 (1964).
159. Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation with Defense Counsel on Problems of a
Criminal Defense, 7 PRAc. LAW. 25, 32 (No. 5, May, 1961).
160. Statement of Francis A. Allen, in Hearings, supra note 1, at 142.
161. Id.
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Former Attorney General Kennedy stated "this responsibility [for
the administration of justice in our courts] is not to see that the pros-
ecution prevails, but that justice does. In the words of the epigram on
a wall of my office: 'The United States wins its point whenever justice
is done its citizens in its courts.' "162 For the poor citizens to receive
justice in the courts, the mechanics of the system require that he go to
court roughly comparable to the prosecution. Thus for the system to
function as desired it must police itself and see that the indigent is
supplied with the necessary assistance to make him a worthy opponent
before the bench.
V. CONCLUSION
From what has been presented in this comment several fundamental
conclusions can be drawn. First, an impoverished defendant, unless he
is provided with assistance in addition to his attorney, is very likely to
be "guilty" before he enters the courtroom. Second, most of our states
do not at this time provide such aid and there is no indication they will,
of their own volition, do so in the near future. Third, the Supreme
Court in recent years has gone far to insure the viability of our judicial
system by dictating reform in criminal procedure. Finally, the question
that arises is whether such reform by the Court will continue to de-
velop and declare a "right to aid in addition to counsel" for the im-
poverished defendant.
Dennis W. Alexander
162. Statement of Robert F. Kennedy, in Hearings, supra note 1, at 11.
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